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Abstract
We extend the concept of a classical two-person static game to the quantum domain, by
giving an Hilbert structure to the space of classical strategies and studying the Battle of the
Sexes game. We show that the introduction of entangled strategies leads to a unique solution
of this game.
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1 Introduction.
Classical Game Theory concerns the study of multiperson decision problems, where two or
more individuals make rational decisions that will influence one another’s welfare. The kind of
problems the theory faces off arise frequently in economics and in social sciences, ranging from
the conflicts of firms in the market to the foreign policy of nations. As far as physics is concerned,
there is an intimate connection between the theory of games and quantum communication theory,
where the task of two distant players is to obtain as much information as possible in a given
physical situation.
Modern Game Theory was first developed in 1944 in the seminal book of Von Neumann and
Morgenstern [1], but a better comprehension of its formal structure and the major mathematical
results were achieved in the following years at Princeton, mainly due to the contribution of the
young brilliant mathematician John Nash. The theory tries to understand the birth and the
development of conflictual or cooperational behaviours between rational and intelligent decision
makers, by analyzing simple but paradigmatic problems, which retain the crucial features ex-
hibited by the real situations in every day life. It is worthwhile to stress that in the theoretical
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language a game refers to any situation where two or more persons, called players, are involved
in a cooperation or a competition among themselves to reach a final state recognized as the
best goal they can obtain from a cooperative or an individual point of view. It is clear that this
general definition encompasses the usual meaning given to a game, i.e. that of a play ( like chess
and draughts ), but it applies to bargaining or trading processes too. The persons who play the
game are assumed to think, and consequently act, in a rational way, by trying to maximize the
expected values of some functions, the payoff functions, which depend on the choices of all the
players and represent their gain at the end of the game. They are also considered as intelligent
beings, in the sense that each player knows about the game everything that we know: therefore
they can make the same inferences about the development of the game that we are able to do.
The purpose of this paper is to try to formalize the concept of Quantum Game ( as opposed
to Classical Game ), by giving a formal quantum structure to the usual mathematical tools
commonly used in analysing decision problems. We have taken inspiration from the paper by
J. Eisert, M. Wilkens and M. Lewenstein [2], but the formal structure of the Quantum Game
Theory we are trying to develop differs completely from their approach, though holding true
that we agree about the special role played by entanglement.
The passage from a classical to a quantum domain will be achieved by using an Hilbert space
of strategies, instead of a discrete set of them, then allowing the possibility of the existence of
linear superpositions between classical strategies: this will naturally enlarge the possible strategic
choices offered to each player from a numerable to a continuous set.
As it will be evident from the analysis of one of the famous and paradigmatic classical games
( the Battle of the Sexes ), the use of a quantum formalism will exhibit a novel feature, the
appearance in entangled strategies of a Nash Equilibrium representing the unique solution of the
game – in contrast with what happens in the classical case, where the theory is not able to make
any unique prediction.
In sections 2 and 3 the basic concepts of Classical Game Theory are enunciated and applied
to the study of the forementioned game. In section 4 we try to define what is meant by a
quantum strategy, as opposed to a classical one, and in sections 5 and 6 we show how it could
be exploited by each player to find out the Nash equilibria in the case of factorizable Quantum
Strategies. In section 7 we extend the method to the entangled strategies, showing that a unique
solution arises for the Battle of the Sexes game.
2 Classical Game Theory
In this chapter we want to provide an introductive view of the basic principles of the theory of
the Static Games of Complete Information. Simple decision problems, in which both players
simultaneously choose their actions ( Static Game ) and receive a payoff depending on their
mutual choices, are contained within this restricted class of games. Moreover, each player knows
perfectly the values of the payoff functions of all his opponents (Complete Information ). Games
which do not belong to this class are Dynamic Games ( the players play sequential moves by
turn, like in chess ) or Games of Incomplete Information ( some player does not know exactly
the payoff functions of his opponents, like in a auction ).
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Every Normal Form Representation of our games must specify:
1. the number of players i = 1 . . . N ;
2. the discrete set of strategies {s}, which constitutes the strategic space Si available to each
player;
3. the payoff functions $i = $i(s1, s2 . . . sN ), which assign the i-th player a real number
depending on the strategies chosen by his opponents.
These functions quantify the benefit that the i-th player gains if the strategies (s1, s2 . . . sN)
are effectively played, and the purpose of each decision maker consists in trying to maximize, in
a sense depending on the context of the game, this real number.
The theory of games deals therefore with the forecast of which will be the most rational
development of a given game: as we will see later, it will not necessarily be the most appealing
one for each player, but the one that each player is forced to play in order to avoid major losses.
In order to simplify the notation, we will denote from now on by si the generic strategy
belonging to the strategic space Si of the i-th player. Each player chooses his own strategy
simultaneously to the others, ( i.e. without knowing what the other players are going to do, but
knowing what they might do ) and has a complete information about the consequences of all the
possible choices.
Having settled the common framework of all the Static Games, it is useful to introduce the
notion of a strictly dominated strategy. Strategy si is strictly dominated by strategy s˜i, if:
$i(s1, . . . , si, . . . , sN ) < $i(s1, . . . , s˜i, . . . , sN ), (2.1)
for every set of strategies (s1, . . . , si−1, si+1, . . . , sN ) of the other players.
This concept suggests a first kind of solution for a given game, where the word solution refers
to the ensemble of the N strategies which are actually played. In fact, making the reasonable
assumption that rational players do not play strictly dominated strategies ( as we have said
before, they pursue the goal of maximizing their benefits, whatever are the strategies of their
opponents ), we could find out the best strategy for each player by simply eliminating all the
dominated ones. The strategy obtained by such a procedure, which is termed Iterated Elimi-
nation of Strictly Dominated Strategies, represents the best action each player could reasonable
perform against his opponent’s decisions. Therefore the set of strategies chosen in such a way
constitutes a possible ( rational ) solution of the game.
Unfortunately, this appealing procedure produces no prediction at all for certain classes of
problems, where no strategy survives the process of elimination. In such a case it is not clear
which action could be considered a rational and optimal decision.
In order to illustrate the concepts we have just introduced, we analyse a simple two-person
static game of complete information, which is known as the Battle of the Sexes. In the usual
exposition of the game a woman, Alice, and a man, Bob, are trying to decide where to spend
the saturday evening: Alice would be happy to attend the Opera, while Bob would like to watch
the football match at the Television, and both of them would be happier to stay together rather
than far apart. We can represent this simple game in a normal form by denoting by O (Opera)
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and T (Television) the two strategies which constitute the common strategic space S and we
can represent their payoff functions by means of a bimatrix like the following one:
(γ, γ) (β, α)
(α, β) (γ, γ)
T
O
O T
Alice
Bob
where α, β, γ are the values assumed by the payoff functions of Alice and Bob in correspon-
dence to the possible choice of strategies: if, for example, both players decide to go to the
Opera ( i.e., if the couple of strategies (O,O) is played ), Alice gains $A(O,O) = α and Bob
gains $B(O,O) = β. In order to satisfy the preferences of the two players mentioned before, the
condition α > β > γ must be imposed. This constraint condition guarantees that we are dealing
with a proper form of the Battle of the Sexes game, with the right options for Alice and Bob.
This is a peculiar game, where strictly dominated strategies do not exist ( in fact according
to Alice, for example, strategy O is better than T if Bob decides to play O, and it is worse if
Bob decides to play T ): neither of the players can rationally eliminate one of his strategies and
prefer the other.
To try to overcome this unpleasant situation, which is not peculiar of the Battle of the
Sexes game, one is induced to resort in general to the concept of Nash Equilibrium, which
permits it to get possible and rational solutions for the kind of games we are referring to ( it is
worthwhile remembering that the word solution corresponds to a set of strategies the rational
players will surely play ). In a N-player normal form representation game, the set of strategies
(s⋆1, s
⋆
2, . . . , s
⋆
N ) constitute a Nash Equilibrium if, for each player i, the strategy s
⋆
i satisfies
the following equation:
$i(s
⋆
1, . . . , s
⋆
i−1, s
⋆
i , s
⋆
i+1, . . . , s
⋆
N ) ≥ $i(s⋆1, . . . , s⋆i−1, si, s⋆i+1, . . . , s⋆N ), (2.2)
for every strategy si belonging to the i-th strategic space Si.
Therefore a Nash Equilibrium corresponds to a set of strategies, each one representing the
best choice for each single player if all his opponents take their best decision too. It exhibits
the appealing property of being strategically stable, because no single player has the incentive
to deviate unilaterally from his strategy without suffering some loss in his own payoff. The
motivation leading to this new concept is based on the following properties:
1. it generalizes the previous and inadequate concept of solution of a game, for it can be
easily proved that every set of strategies surviving the process of elimination of strictly
dominated strategies constitutes the unique Nash Equilibrium of the game – the converse
statement being not necessarily true. We will in particular see that the Battle of the Sexes
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possesses two Nash Equilibria in pure strategies ( representing two possible predictions
for the development of the game ), while the process of elimination of strategies cannot
give any result;
2. it is, as already said, a stable equilibrium, in the sense that no player could gain better by
unilaterally deviating from his predicted strategy.
Returning back to the analysis of our game and in order to find out which is the pair of
strategies which satisfy the Nash-Equilibrium conditions (2.2), we must solve the two following
coupled inequalities in the unknown strategies s⋆A and s
⋆
B , where the letters A and B stand
obviously for Alice and Bob:


$A(s
⋆
A, s
⋆
B) ≥ $A(sA, s⋆B) ∀ sA ∈ S,
$B(s
⋆
A, s
⋆
B) ≥ $B(s⋆A, sB) ∀ sB ∈ S.
(2.3)
It is easy to verify that two couples of strategies satisfy these conditions for the Battle
of the Sexes Game: there exist therefore two Nash Equilibria, corresponding to the choices
(s⋆A = O , s
⋆
B = O ) or (s
⋆
A = T , s
⋆
B = T ). These strategies are strategically stable exactly in
the sense given above.
The appearance of two possible solutions of the game in this peculiar case is rather discom-
forting ( being the first one more favourable to Alice, while the second is favourable to Bob ),
even if this is better than having no solution, as it was the case before the Nash Equilibrium
was introduced. However, as we will show in the next sections, this problem disappears in a
quantum context, where we will be able to exhibit ( in peculiar situations to be specified ) only
one solution of the game.
3 Mixed Classical Strategies
Although the notion of a Nash Equilibrium represents a very clever new concept of solution
for a game, it is still possible to exhibit simple games not possessing Nash Equilibria, this fact
leading to a situation that does not display any rational prediction about the development of
the game. This usually happens in games where each player would like to outguess the decisions
taken by his opponents ( like in poker or in a battle ) in order to gain an advantage over them.
To solve this new kind of games we must resort to the introduction of the concept of the
Mixed Classical Strategies, as opposed to the Pure ones presented before: in a normal form
representation game, a Mixed Strategy for the i-th player is a probability distribution which
assigns a probability pαi to each pure strategy s
α
i , where α runs over all the possible strategies
belonging to the strategic space Si of the i-th player.
This means that each player chooses one of the possible strategies by resorting to chance,
according to the probability distribution which could assure him the best result.
This definition generalizes the notion of strategy given before, since a pure strategy can
always be seen as a mixed one with probability distribution which is equal to one for a particular
strategy and zero for all the others. According to Harsanyi [3], it is possible to interpret such
a mixed strategy in terms of the uncertainty of each player about what another player will do.
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The introduction of a probability distribution in the space of strategies forces one to modify
the concept of the payoff function for the i-th player, leading to an expected payoff function
$¯i:
$¯i({p1} , {p2} , . . . , {pN}) =
∑
α,β,...,γ
pα1 p
β
2 . . . p
γ
N $i(s
α
1 , s
β
2 , . . . , s
γ
N ) (3.1)
where {pi} is the set of the probabilities associated to the strategies of the space Si.
We note that $¯i is no longer a function of the strategies, depending now on their probability
distributions and represents an average gain for the i-th player.
The usefulness in dealing with mixed strategies resides in a remarkable result proved by
Nash [4], stating that in every N-player normal form game with finite strategic spaces there
always exists at least one Nash Equilibrium, in pure or mixed strategies. Therefore, one is led
to modify slightly the definition of Nash Equilibrium in order to incorporate mixed strategies
too. In the two-player normal form games with two strategies, like the Battle of the Sexes, we
are concerned with the probabilities
{
p11, p
2
1 = 1− p11
}
for the first player, and
{
p12, p
2
2 = 1− p12
}
for the second one.
Since only two of them are independent, we put p11 = p and p
1
2 = q, writing $¯i({p1} , {p2}) ≡
$¯i(p, q). Using this simplified notation, we say that the mixed strategies characterized by the
probabilities (p⋆, q⋆) correspond to a Nash Equilibrium if the expected payoff functions satisfy
the following conditions:


$¯1(p
⋆, q⋆) ≥ $¯1(p, q⋆) ∀ p ∈ [0, 1],
$¯2(p
⋆, q⋆) ≥ $¯2(p⋆, q) ∀ q ∈ [0, 1].
(3.2)
We are now equipped with a more powerful mathematical tool, which can be applied to the
analysis of the Battle of the Sexes. Let us suppose that Alice decides to resort to a probabilistic
strategy in which she chooses Opera ( s11 ) with probability p ( and obviously Television ( s
2
1 )
with probabilty 1− p ) and Bob does the same, but with probability q for Opera ( s12 ) and 1− q
for Television ( s22 ).
We can then calculate their expected payoff functions through equation (3.1), i.e. by sum-
ming all the joined probabilities relative to each couple of strategies, multiplied by the proper
coefficients which appear in the bimatrix of the game, obtaining:
$¯A(p, q) = p[q(α− 2γ + β) + γ − β] + β + q(γ − β), (3.3)
$¯B(p, q) = q[p(α− 2γ + β) + γ − α] + α+ p(γ − α).
Nash Equilibria can be found by imposing the two conditions:


$¯A(p
⋆, q⋆)− $¯A(p, q⋆) = (p⋆ − p)[ q⋆(α+ β − 2γ)− β + γ ] ≥ 0 ∀ p ∈ [0, 1],
$¯B(p
⋆, q⋆)− $¯B(p⋆, q) = (q⋆ − q)[ p⋆(α+ β − 2γ)− α+ γ ] ≥ 0 ∀ q ∈ [0, 1].
(3.4)
They are satisfied if the two factors in each inequality have both the same sign. There are
three possibilities:
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1. p⋆(1) = 1, q
⋆
(1) = 1.
In such a case both Alice and Bob choose to play O, i.e. a pure strategy. Their correspond-
ing expected payoff functions are $¯A(1, 1) = α and $¯B(1, 1) = β, and since α > β > γ the
following inequalities hold:


$¯A(1, 1) − $¯A(p, 1) = (1− p)(α− γ) ≥ 0 ∀ p ∈ [0, 1],
$¯B(1, 1) − $¯B(1, q) = (1− q)(β − γ) ≥ 0 ∀ q ∈ [0, 1].
(3.5)
2. p⋆(2) = 0, q
⋆
(2) = 0.
The strategy is again a pure one, both Alice and Bob play T , and $¯A(0, 0) = β and
$¯B(0, 0) = α ( note that $¯A and $¯B are reversed with respect to the previous case ).
Moreover:


$¯A(0, 0) − $¯A(p, 0) = p(β − γ) ≥ 0 ∀ p ∈ [0, 1],
$¯B(0, 0) − $¯B(0, q) = q(α− γ) ≥ 0 ∀ q ∈ [0, 1].
(3.6)
These two Nash Equilibria correspond to the solutions already found using pure strategies
only, but the introduction of mixed strategies allows for the existence of a third kind of
solutions.
3. Inequalities (3.4) can be satisified also for p⋆ and q⋆ different from 0 or 1. In such a case
the factors p⋆− p and q⋆− q can be positive or negative, depending on the values of p and
q. Then, the only way in order to fulfil conditions (3.4) consists in equating to zero the
coefficients of p⋆ − p and q⋆ − q, obtaining:
p⋆(3) =
α− γ
α+ β − 2γ , q
⋆
(3) =
β − γ
α+ β − 2γ , (3.7)
where p⋆ and q⋆ are correctly larger than zero and less than one. Moreover they correspond
to a Nash Equilibrium for which the gains of both players coincide:
$¯A(p
⋆
(3), q
⋆
(3)) = $¯B(p
⋆
(3), q
⋆
(3)) =
αβ − γ2
α+ β − 2γ . (3.8)
It can be easily shown that the expected payoff functions for both players give now strictly
less reward than the other two feasible strategies (O,O) or (T, T ), since:
γ < $¯A(B)(p
⋆
(3), q
⋆
(3)) < β < α. (3.9)
We note that the solution of the game corresponding to the third case gives a good example
of the exact meaning of Nash Equilibrium. In fact, this peculiar concept of equilibrium can be
defined only if all players are assumed to accept the same logic, i.e. that of achieving the best
result if all the players play together at their best. In the last case analysed the equilibrium
corresponds to the conditions $¯A(p
⋆
(3), q
⋆
(3)) = $¯A(p, q
⋆
(3)) and $¯B(p
⋆
(3), q
⋆
(3)) = $¯A(p
⋆
(3), q). This
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means that if, for example, Alice accepts the logic of Nash Equilibrium but Bob does not, the
last one could choose the value of q minimizing $¯A(p
⋆
(3), q) without suffering any loss of gain.
The introduction of mixed strategies has not solved the problem of Alice and Bob: even
in this case the theory fails to say which one of the obtained Nash Equilibria represents the
real development of the game, because they all satisfy our notion of rational solution and are
therefore equally compelling.
We might now ask if it would be possible to obtain a unique solution for the problem of the
Battle of the Sexes by modifying again the theoretical structure of the game, in resemblance to
what one does when enriching the concept of pure strategy by defining a probability distribution
over the strategic space. This task is feasible introducing the notion of Quantum Strategy,
in connection with the concept of Entanglement.
4 Quantum Game Theory
The purpose of this section is that of extending the notion of a classical ( pure or mixed ) strategy
by giving a richer structure to the strategic space, so that it contains the old set of strategies as
a proper subspace. Therefore from now on, instead of considering only a discrete and finite set
of strategies, we will permit the existence of linear superpositions of them, by giving the formal
structure of an Hilbert space to the strategic space. This allows the possibility of obtaining
the Pure Quantum Strategies, defined as linear combinations, with complex coefficients, of pure
classical ones. According to the orthodox intepretation of quantum mechanics, the squared
modula of these complex coefficients have to be interpreted as the probability of having played
one particular pure classical strategy. It is worthwhile observing that this intepretation of pure
quantum strategies does not differ from the classical notion of a mixed strategy introduced
before, because we are presently dealing with a restricted class of games ( static games ), where
typical quantum interference effects between amplitudes do not occur.
Let us now apply the quantum approach to the study of the Battle of the Sexes, assuming
that the new space of strategies available to Alice and Bob consists of a two-dimensional Hilbert
space, whose orthonormal basis vectors |O〉 and |T 〉 correspond to classical strategies O and T,
respectively.
An arbitrary pure quantum strategy is therefore described by the normalized state vector:
|ψ〉 = a |O〉+ b |T 〉 , aa⋆ + bb⋆ = 1. (4.1)
In order to use the normal form representation, we must define the quantum analogues
of classical expected payoff functions and to decide the way each player can pick out his best
strategy, i.e. the strategy which fulfils the conditions to be a Nash Equilibrium, if it does exist.
With the aim of solving these issues, we must make the following general assumptions, which
we hold to represent the common theoretical ingredients of all quantum games we can devise.
1. Unlike in the classical game theory, we have to fix an arbitrary initial quantum state be-
longing to the Hilbert space S = SA⊗SB, obtained as a direct product of the two strategic
spaces of the two players, whose orthonormal bases consist of the vectors associated to the
pure classical strategies.
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2. Each player can manipulate the initial state vector ( his strategy ) by performing some
local transformation in order to obtain a suitable final state vector which will represent
the quantum strategy the two players are going to play. In this approach, since the states
correspond to the strategy, the operators related to the transformations correspond to the
tactics to be employed in the game.
3. The expected payoff of each player must be evaluated by calculating first the squared
modula of the projections of the final quantum state onto the basis vectors of space S, and
then by adding up the obtained numbers multiplied by the appropriate payoff coefficients
( deducible from the payoff bimatrix ).
4. Each player must eventually play the classical pure strategy, which results from a mea-
surement process on the final quantum strategy, i.e. from a projection onto the canonical
basis of his own strategic space.
Before proceeding on, it is worthwhile making some comments about these assumptions, in
order to make clear their meaning and utility.
Having given an Hilbert structure to the strategic space of each player, it is natural to
describe their mutual choices as state vectors belonging to the direct product of their Hilbert
spaces, which includes a continuous number of possible strategies. Indeed, it is due to this
richer structure that the Quantum Theory of Games exhibits more attractive features than its
classical version: we will in fact be able to construct factorizable strategies, which are obtained
as a direct product of two well-defined strategies for each single player, and entangled strategies,
which cannot be decomposed in such a way and cannot be reduced to the previous ones by
applying local transformations only. It will be seen that the presence of such an high degree of
non-local correlations between the strategies of the two players will provide us with a unique
Nash Equilibrium solution of the Battle of The Sexes.
As stated in the first of the previous rules, we have introduced the notion of the initial
quantum strategy for the two players: this state has no classical analogue and no particular
meaning in our quantum context, representing only a starting vector which the two players
must manipulate in a suitable way in order to obtain the final strategy, this last one being the
real important object.
If we start working with a factorizable initial state vector, the results ( existence of Nash
equilibria and value of expected payoff functions ) of our treatment will not depend on its par-
ticular form, for each player can modify it with local operations in order to choose his own best
strategy. Indeed, what is important in determining the reward given to each player, it is the form
of the final state vector, which corresponds to the strategy effectively played by them1. This
independence from the starting point will not hold true, as we will see, in the case of entangled
strategies, forcing us to impose limitations on the form of the initial vector.
The second assumption deals with the possibility given to each player to properly manipulate
the initial state vector in order to find out the best final strategy, i.e. the one which satisfies
the condition of corresponding to a Nash Equilibrium. The local transformations involved will
depend on a certain number of parameters appearing as coefficients of the final strategy and
1These considerations cannot be applied to reference [2], where the results appear to be strictly initial state
dependent.
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determining the value of expected payoff functions. These parameters are the quantum analogues
of the p and q parameters encountered in the classical mixed strategies, and the goal of each
player will consist in searching for their best values.
The choice of the operators to be used is constrained only by the demand that, when using
factorizable quantum states, the quantum version of the theory of games should be able to
reproduce exactly all the results of the classical theory, whenever the players use mixed classical
strategies. We are therefore free to choose the operators, satisfying the forementioned constraint,
in a such a way to make as simple as possible the calculations.
The third assumption deals with the probabilistic structure of the theory, and asserts that
each player can calculate an expected payoff function, representing the average reward each
player would receive if the game were repeated many times ( it has exactly the same meaning
as in classical theory ), starting from the same final strategy.
Finally, the fourth assumption states that each player must effectively play the pure classical
strategy which emerges after a process of measurement, to be performed on the state vector
representing the compound final strategy. In fact, according to the usual postulates of Quantum
Mechanics, after the measurement of a suitable observable, the final state vector collapses onto
one of the vectors of the canonical basis of the strategic space (which are pure classical strategies,
due to the first assumption ).
5 Factorizable Quantum Strategies
Let us define the four-dimensional Hilbert space of common strategies S = SA⊗SB of Alice and
Bob for the Battle of the Sexes Game by giving its orthonormal basis vectors:
S = SA ⊗ SB = (|OO〉, |OT 〉, |TO〉, |TT 〉), (5.1)
where the first position is reserved to the state of Alice and the second one to that of Bob.
These vectors permit it to write all the possible pure classical strategies which Alice and Bob
can simultaneously play, i.e. states of the type [x|0〉+ y|T 〉 ]⊗ [w|O〉+ z|T 〉 ].
Let us call A and B two unitary and unimodular matrices, representing the transformations
that Alice and Bob may respectively use to manipulate their own strategies ( they are written
in the canonical basis where the first vector is denoted by |O〉 and the second by |T 〉 ):
A =
[
a b
−b⋆ a⋆
]
, B =
[
c d
−d⋆ c⋆
]
,
{
aa⋆ + bb⋆ = 1
cc⋆ + dd⋆ = 1
. (5.2)
Since a state of the type r|O〉+ s|T 〉 can always be obtained from states |O〉 or |T 〉 through
SU(2) transformations, the present procedure will be invariant with respect to the choice of the
initial state. Then, we can make the calculation particularly simple starting from one of the
four states |OO〉, |OT 〉, |TO〉, |TT 〉. Let us then choose for example |ψin〉 = |OO〉.
By applying operators (5.2) to the initial state, we obtain a final common quantum strategy
depending on the four complex coefficients a, b, c, d:
|ψfin〉 = A⊗B |ψin〉 = ac|OO〉 − ad⋆|OT 〉 − b⋆c|TO〉+ b⋆d⋆|TT 〉. (5.3)
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It is now possible to compute the expected payoff functions of both players by projecting
the final state onto the canonical basis of S = SA ⊗ SB and applying the third quantum rule:
$¯A = |a|2[(α+ β − 2γ)|c|2 − β + γ] + β + (γ − β)|c|2, (5.4)
$¯B = |c|2[(α+ β − 2γ)|a|2 − α+ γ] + α+ (γ − α)|a|2,
where we have eliminated the parameters b and d.
Now Alice and Bob can respectively find out which are the values of coefficients |a|2 and |c|2
satisfying the Nash Equilibrium condition, whose defining inequalities (3.2) remain valid also
for Quantum Game Theory. By repeating calculations similar to those of section 3, it is easy to
notice that the desired values for the coefficients are represented by the following pairs:
(|a|2 = 0 , |c|2 = 0) or (|a|2 = 1 , |c|2 = 1) or (|a|2 = α− γ
α+ β − 2γ , |c|
2 =
β − γ
α+ β − 2γ ) (5.5)
The first and the second pair of values are the quantum analogues of the pure classical
strategies in which both players choose the same strategy. The final quantum strategy and the
relative expected payoff functions are easily obtained by substituting these values in equations
(5.3) and (5.4):
(|a|2 = 0 , |c|2 = 0) ⇒ |ψfin〉 = |TT 〉 ⇒ $¯A = β $¯B = α, (5.6)
(|a|2 = 1 , |c|2 = 1) ⇒ |ψfin〉 = |OO〉 ⇒ $¯A = α $¯B = β.
The third pair of values for coefficients |a|2 and |c|2 corresponds to a mixed classical strat-
egy played with probabilities given by equation (3.7). In fact, the factorizable final quantum
strategy2 and the expected payoff functions for Alice and Bob assume the following form:
|ψfin〉 = 1
α+ β − 2γ [
√
α− γ|O〉 −
√
β − γ|T 〉 ] · [
√
β − γ|O〉 − √α− γ|T 〉 ] (5.7)
⇒ $¯A = $¯B = αβ − γ
2
α+ β − 2γ .
The quantities $¯A and $¯B have the same values we found in the case of mixed classical
strategies – see equation (3.8).
Due to the forementioned invariance, if we were started from another initial quantum state
we would have obtained different values for coefficients |a|2 and |c|2 satisfying Nash Equilibrium
conditions, but the corresponding expressions for the final quantum strategy and the expected
payoff functions for both players would be unchanged ( always apart from phase factors ).
Concluding, we see that factorizable quantum strategies are able to reproduce exactly the
same results obtained before, when dealing with the mixed classical version of the Battle of
the Sexes game. The exploitation of a quantum formalism and, particularly, of factorizable
strategies does not constitute an improvement with respect to the classical theory: the game
remains undecidible, since there is no way to prefer one Nash strategy with respect to the other
ones. Nevertheless, Quantum Game Theory contains the Classical one as a subset, and quantum
factorizable strategies correspond to classical mixed ones.
2We have omitted for simplicity useless phase factors in the coefficients of the final states, since we are
considering only static games, where there is no evolution.
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6 Density Matrix Approach to Quantum Game Theory
Before beginning the study of the properties of entangled quantum strategies, we show how to
rewrite the entire formalism developed so far using density matrices instead of state vectors, and
introducing a new kind of transformations. It is worthwhile doing it in order to be able to make
simple the mathematical calculations when entangled strategies are used, bearing in mind that,
in the case of factorizable states, the solutions we got in the previous section must be obtained
again.
Let us therefore define a unitary and hermitian operator C interchanging vectors |O〉 and
|T 〉:
{
C |O〉 = |T 〉
C |T 〉 = |O〉 , C
† = C = C−1 . (6.1)
We assume now that each player can modify his own strategy by applying to his reduced
part of the total density matrix ρin, which represents the initial state of the game, the following
transformation:
ρ
A(B)
fin = [ p I ρ
A(B)
in I
† + (1− p)C ρA(B)in C† ] . (6.2)
This operation can be interpreted as the choice of each player to act with the identity I with
probability p and with C with probability (1 − p), and gives rise to the following final density
matrix:
ρfin = pq IA ⊗ IB ρin I†A ⊗ I†B + p(1− q)IA ⊗ CB ρin I†A ⊗ C†B +
q(1− p)CA ⊗ IB ρinC†A ⊗ I†B + (1− p)(1− q)CA ⊗ CB ρinC†A ⊗ C†B (6.3)
It is possible to show that, if we start from a density matrix corresponding to one of the
four states |OO〉, |OT 〉, |TO〉 and |TT 〉 which we could have been used indifferently in the case
of factorizable quantum strategies, the particular kind of transformation employed in equation
(6.2) reproduces the same results obtained in section 5.
Let us choose for example the initial density matrix corresponding to the state |ψin〉 = |OO〉
used in the preceding section. Then from equation (6.3) we obtain:
ρfin = pq|OO〉〈OO|+ p(1− q)|OT 〉〈OT |+
(1− p)q|TO〉〈TO|+ (1− p)(1− q)|TT 〉〈TT |. (6.4)
In order to calculate the payoff functions, we must introduce two payoff operators:
PA = α|OO〉〈OO| + γ(|OT 〉〈OT |+ |TO〉〈TO|) + β|TT 〉〈TT |, (6.5)
PB = β|OO〉〈OO|+ γ(|OT 〉〈OT |+ |TO〉〈TO|) + α|TT 〉〈TT |.
The payoff functions can then be obtained as mean values of these operators:
$¯A = Tr(PA ρfin) $¯B = Tr(PB ρfin). (6.6)
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Three Nash Equilibria arise: those for (p⋆ = 1, q⋆ = 1) and for (p⋆ = 0, q⋆ = 0), corresponding
to ρfin = |OO〉〈OO| and ρfin = |TT 〉〈TT |, respectively, and a third one associated to the final
density matrix:
ρfin =
1
α+ β − 2γ [ (α− γ)|O〉〈O| + (β − γ)|T 〉〈T | ] ⊗
1
α+ β − 2γ [ (β − γ)|O〉〈O|+ (α− γ)|T 〉〈T | ] (6.7)
The payoff functions corresponding to these strategies are the same we have already obtained
in the previous section – see equations (5.6) and (5.7)3
Concluding, we have shown that it is possible to get the same results one obtains in the
classical version of our game, by allowing the two players to manipulate their own strategy
with unitary and unimodular operators or, equivalently, through a particular transformation
involving two hermitian operators (C and I ), one interchanging states |O〉 and |T 〉 and the
other leaving them unvaried.
7 Entangled Quantum Strategies
In sections 5 and 6 we have seen, using two different but equivalent ways, that the exploitation
of factorizable quantum strategies does not modify at all the results we can obtain by applying
classical game theory to the analysis of the Battle of the Sexes game. On the other hand, it is
just the richer structure we have given to the strategic space of both players that allows us to
obtain new results. In fact, up to here we have not introduced entangled states in the quantum
version of the game: as a matter of fact, we are going to show how an entangled couple of
strategies played by Alice and Bob will lead to a unique solution of the game, always satisfying
the Nash Equilibrium condition.
According to what as been shown in the previous section, we can restrict ourselves to deal
with density matrices associated to strategies, rather than to state vectors, and to use the
transformations of equation (6.3). The choice of the initial density matrix is relevant, in so
far as the payoff functions corresponding to the Nash Equilibria turn out to be all initial state
dependent.
Let us start assuming that Alice and Bob have at their disposal the following entangled state:
|ψin〉 = a|OO〉+ b|TT 〉 |a|2 + |b|2 = 1 , (7.1)
with the associated density matrix:
ρin = |a|2|OO〉〈OO|+ ab⋆|OO〉〈TT |+ a⋆b|TT 〉〈OO|+ |b|2|TT 〉〈TT |. (7.2)
3We note that starting with the state |TT 〉 one obtains the same Nash Equilibria but now (p⋆ = 1, q⋆ = 1)
corresponds to ρfin = |TT 〉〈TT | and (p
⋆ = 0, q⋆ = 0) to ρfin = |OO〉〈OO|. If we choose |OT 〉 or |TO〉 as starting
states, the same final density matrices are found for (p⋆ = 0, q⋆ = 1) and (p⋆ = 1, q⋆ = 0) or (p⋆ = 1, q⋆ = 0)
and (p⋆ = 0, q⋆ = 1), respectively. The third Nash Equilibrium corresponding to the ρfin given by (6.7) is always
found.
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By using equation (6.3) we obtain the expression for the final density matrix ρfin, which
depends on parameters a, b, p and q, and, through eq. (6.7), also the expected payoff functions
for both players:
$¯A(p, q) = p[ q(α+ β − 2γ)− α|b|2 − β|a|2 + γ ] +
q[−α|b|2 − β|a|2 + γ ] + α|b|2 + β|a|2,
$¯B(p, q) = q[ p(α+ β − 2γ)− β|b|2 − α|a|2 + γ ] +
p[−β|b|2 − α|a|2 + γ ] + β|b|2 + α|a|2. (7.3)
Then, three Nash Equilibria arise from the following two inequalities:
{
$¯A(p
⋆, q⋆)− $¯A(p, q⋆) = (p⋆ − p)[ q⋆(α+ β − 2γ)− α|b|2 − β|a|2 + γ ] ≥ 0,
$¯B(p
⋆, q⋆)− $¯B(p⋆, q) = (q⋆ − q)[ p⋆(α+ β − 2γ)− β|b|2 − α|a|2 + γ ] ≥ 0. (7.4)
Let us examine separately the three different Nash Equilibria:
1. p⋆(1) = q
⋆
(1) = 1.
In such a case, the initial and the final density matrix representing the common strategies
played by the players turn out to be equal and the expected payoff functions are:
$¯A(1, 1) = α|a|2 + β|b|2 (7.5)
$¯B(1, 1) = β|a|2 + α|b|2 (7.6)
2. p⋆(2) = q
⋆
(2) = 0.
In correspondence to these values the final density matrix is obtained by reversing the ini-
tial strategies ( ρfin = CACBρinC
†
BC
†
A ), and the corresponding expected payoff functions
turn out to be interchanged with respect to the previous case:
$¯A(0, 0) = β|a|2 + α|b|2, (7.7)
$¯B(0, 0) = α|a|2 + β|b|2 (7.8)
3. p⋆(3) =
(α−γ)|a|2+(β−γ)|b|2
α+β−2γ , q
⋆
(3) =
(α−γ)|b|2+(β−γ)|a|2
α+β−2γ .
Due to the condition α > β > γ one sees immediately that 0 < p⋆(3) < 1 and 0 < q
⋆
(3) < 1.
The expected payoff functions of both players turn out to be the same, and display the
following dependance on the parameters of the game:
$¯A(p
⋆
(3), q
⋆
(3)) = $¯B(p
⋆
(3), q
⋆
(3)) =
1
α+ β − 2γ [αβ + (α− β)
2|a|2|b|2 − γ2 ] (7.9)
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We have found again three different Nash Equilibria for the game, whose expected payoff
functions are so related:
$¯A(B)(p
⋆
(3), q
⋆
(3)) < $¯A(B)(p
⋆
(1), q
⋆
(1)) , $¯A(B)(p
⋆
(3), q
⋆
(3)) < $¯A(B)(p
⋆
(2), q
⋆
(2)). (7.10)
This simply means that both Alice and Bob would prefer to play strategies p⋆(1) = q
⋆
(1) = 1
or p⋆(2) = q
⋆
(2) = 0 rather than the third one, nonetheless being unable to decide which one of the
two. In fact:
$¯A(1, 1) − $¯A(0, 0) = (α− β)(|a|2 − |b|2),
$¯B(1, 1) − $¯B(0, 0) = (α− β)(|b|2 − |a|2). (7.11)
Therefore, for |a| > |b| Alice would prefer the first Nash Equilibrium, while Bob prefers
the second one, and the contrary happens if |a| < |b|. However, there is a case in which both
Alice and Bob can make the same choice: it corresponds to starting with an initial state having
|a| = |b|, i.e. with:
|ψin〉 = 1√
2
[ |OO〉+ |TT 〉 ] , (7.12)
ρin =
1
2
[ |OO〉〈OO|+ |OO〉〈TT |+ |TT 〉〈OO|+ |TT 〉〈TT | ] .
It is now trivial to find out which are the Nash Equilibria for this peculiar initial state. We
have:
(p⋆ = 0, q⋆ = 0) ⇒ $A = $B = (α+ β)
2
(p⋆ = 1, q⋆ = 1) ⇒ $A = $B = (α+ β)
2
(p⋆ =
1
2
, q⋆ =
1
2
) ⇒ $A = $B = α+ β + 2γ
4
(7.13)
The fact that both players have the same expected payoff functions constitutes the most
attractive feature of having exploited entangled strategies. In fact, now it is possible to choose
a unique Nash Equilibrium by discarding the ones which give the players the lesser reward: the
remaining couple of values for p and q will then represent the unique solution of the game, which
may satisfy both players, in contrast to what happens in the case of factorizable strategies, where
there is no way to choose one of the three equivalent strategies. In fact, from eq.s (7.13) one
sees immediately that:
$¯A(B)(p
⋆ = 0, q⋆ = 0) = $¯A(B)(p
⋆ = 1, q⋆ = 1) > $¯A(B)(p
⋆ = 1/2, q⋆ = 1/2). (7.14)
The entangled quantum strategy which corresponds to both values (p⋆ = 0, q⋆ = 0) and
(p⋆ = 1, q⋆ = 1) is the same and it is precisely the entangled state we started from:
|ψfin〉 = 1√
2
[ |OO〉+ |TT 〉 ] . (7.15)
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We have therefore obtained the result that the state (7.15) represents the quantum entangled
pair of strategies which satisfy the Nash Equilibrium conditions, i.e. it represents the best
rational couple of choices which are stable against unilateral deviations, and gives an higher
reward to both players than the other possible Nash Equilibrium (p⋆ = 1/2, q⋆ = 1/2).
The entangled strategy (7.15) can therefore be termed the unique solution of the quantum
version of the Battle of the Sexes game.
8 Conclusions
In this paper the classical theory of games has been extended to a quantum domain, by giving
an Hilbert structure to the strategic spaces of the players, so allowing the existence of linear
combinations of classical strategies to be interpreted according to the usual formalism of or-
thodox quantum mechanics. The only remarkable assumption we have made, reproducing the
usual results of the classical game theory in the case of factorizable quantum strategies, is that
each player must choose his strategy by performing quantum measurements on his state vector.
Another weak assumption deals with the form of the operator which both players can apply in
order to properly manipulate their strategies: we have shown that is sufficient, to reproduce the
classical results and to obtain new ones, to restrict our attention to a transformation involving
two particular hermitian operators.
We have applied this formalism to the study of the Battle of the Sexes game, in order to
find out in which cases a quantum strategy could exhibit more attractive features than the
classical theory predicts; it has been shown that the use of factorizable quantum strategies ( i.e.
factorizable states in the strategic space ) by both players, cannot improve their expected payoff
functions and reproduces the same behaviour of the classical version of the game: the Battle
admits three Nash Equilibria which can be considered as three possible solutions of the game and
the players cannot rationally decide which one to choose. On the contrary, it has been shown
that if both players are allowed to play entangled quantum strategies, the game admits again
three possible Nash Equilibria, but a unique solution. In fact, in this situation both players get
the same expected payoff and the solution is represented by the Nash strategy which gives more
reward. This new feature is originated from the fact that both players are forced to act in the
same way, this being due to the strong correlation present in the entangled form of the solution
strategy 1√
2
(|OO〉+ |TT 〉). The meaning of this result is in some sense obvious. If Alice and Bob
are obliged to play the same strategy and have the possibility of choosing together sometimes O
and sometimes T ( this peculiarity not being present in the classical game and in the factorizable
quantum case ), it is a priori clear that they obtain the best reward playing one-half times O
and one-half T . In any case, what is important is the fact that the entangled strategies, in the
context of a quantum approach to the Theory of Games, give such a result.
Concluding, we can observe that it could be interesting to apply the quantum version to
the study of the dynamic games. In such a case the transformations applied to the strategies
represent the moves played sequentially by the players. New results could then come out from
some clever choice of these transformations.
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